ABSTRACT: Surprisingly precise results are provided on how much more one should disvalue being wrong than one values being right.
Introduction
William James famously thought that epistemic agents differ in how much they comparatively hate error and love truth. Some people "regard the chase for truth as paramount, and the avoidance of error as secondary; or we may, on the other hand, treat the avoidance of error as more imperative, and let truth take its chance." 1 He thought that being a person of the second sort was reasonable. However, it seems that he was wrong. On reasonable assumptions, and bracketing non-epistemic utility considerations, we can show that a rational agent should 'hate' or disvalue being certain of p if p is false at least 1/(log4−1)≈2.588 times as much as she 'loves' or values being certain of p if p is true. More generally, if r≥1/2, one should 'hate' having credence r in p when p is false at least (2r−1)/(1 − 2r + log 4 + 2 log r) times as much as one 'loves' having credence r in p. For instance, you should 'hate' assigning credence 0.95 to a falsehood more than 2.345 times as much as you 'love' assigning credence 0.95 to a truth.
It is surprising that such precise results can be obtained. They will be obtained as a corollary of a necessary condition on proper concave epistemic utility functions.
Normally, epistemic utility functions measure the epistemic value of one's credences given what the truth of the matter is. In this paper, our focus will be on the epistemic utility of one's credence in a single proposition p, however, rather than the epistemic utility of one's epistemic state as a whole. This is all that is needed for the results about love of truth and hatred of error that are announced in the introduction and it simplifies the notation while focusing us on the essentials.
Proper epistemic utility functions
Throughout, fix a proposition p of interest. We can measure the epistemic utility of a credence r in p by a pair of functions. U T (r) is the utility of having credence r in p should p be true. U F (r) is the utility of having credence r in p should p be false.
These functions measure how much one 'loves' or 'hates' being right or wrong about p. We shall allow U T and U F to take either finite or infinite values at extreme points. Our main interest is in the case where r≥1/2. Normally, scoring rule analyses work in terms of measures of inaccuracythe greater the number, the worse. We shall formulate the results in terms of utilities in order to fit with the value-based considerations driving the analysis, and we shall do so in such a way that a familiarity with the scoring-rule literature is not required in the reader. It is worth noting that the above setting is somewhat more general than typical scoring-rule analyses as it allows that the utility-if-true and utility-if-false functions can differ depending on the proposition p in question. Our claims are always about a single proposition p.
We will now impose some reasonable conditions on U T and U F .. The first constraint is uncontroversial: This assumption could be weakened, but it will make the mathematics more convenient.
The following constraint is a weaker version of a fairly standard, though controversial, assumption about scoring rules: A continuous function f is concave on an interval I provided that f((a+b)/2)≥(f(a)+f(b))/2 for all a and b in the domain. 3 Our concavity assumption (c) parallels a standard but controversial convexity assumption on scoring rules (utilities increase with better match between credences and truth, while scores decrease with better match), but it is weaker than that assumption by being restricted to the case where one assigns credence r≥1/2 to a falsehood.
The concavity assumption (c) is in fact quite plausible given the restriction.
Intuitively, if p is false, you lose more -or at least no less -by a fixed increase of credence the closer your credence is to 1. Thus, an increase in credence from 0.50 to 0.55 is mildly unfortunate, an increase from 0.55 to 0.60 is no better and very likely worse, an increase from 0.60 to 0.65 is still no better and very likely worse, and so on, until the extremely unfortunate increase in disutility from 0.95 to 1 when you become certain of a falsehood. Generalizing this reasoning to all increments implies the concavity of U F .. 4 Alternately, one might argue like this. Suppose p is false. It intuitively takes a stronger piece of evidence to return one from credence 0.95 to credence 0.90 than to return one from credence 0.90 to credence 0.85, and so on. Therefore, the loss of epistemic utility in moving from 0.90 to 0.95 is greater than in moving from 0.85 to 0.90, because it is harder to return.
Intuitions might be divided on whether U F is concave on the full interval [0,1]. I am inclined to think it shouldn't be taken to be concave on [0,1/2]. If it were concave, then the gain in utility in a transition from, say, credence 0.25 in a falsehood p to a credence 0.15 in that falsehood would be at least as great as the gain in utility in a transition from 0.50 to 0.40. But the latter seems a more significant transition: it is a move from being on the fence to having a significant inclination to the truth. The final constraint is the crucial one:
3 In general, if we have no continuity assumption, to define concavity we need to say that f(αa+ ( A pair of utility functions is proper, roughly speaking, just in case it is never decision-theoretically rational, in respect of the epistemic utility of these functions, to change one's credences without any further evidence. 5 Before giving a formal characterization of propriety, we can give an example of an improper pair of utility functions, and explain why it is improper. It may seem initially very plausible to choose the linear functions U T (r)=r−1/2 and U F (r)=1/2−r. But this has would have untoward consequences. Suppose p is the proposition that a toss of a fair six-sided die will not yield 6. Obviously, my credence in p should be 5/6. But consider the expected epistemic utility of having credence 5/6 in the die toss. I have probability 5/6 of being right and 1/6 of being wrong. My expected epistemic utility, then, is ( (1)+(1/6)U F
(1)=1/3. And 1/3>2/9. More precisely, one can easily check (say, by drawing a graph) that the expected epistemic utility maximizing credence in this case is 1. But it's perverse to switch one's credence from 5/6 to 1 in this case, and any pair of utility functions that recommends it is perverse, or at least improper. 6 Formally, we say that the pair is proper provided that for each r in [0,1], the expected utility function U(x;r)=rU T (x)+(1−r)U F (x) has a maximum at x=r.
Propriety can also be seen to follow from a continuity assumption on U T and U F and two constraints on one's rational method for assigning credences, along with the assumption that there is a rational method for assigning credences.
We want our rational method for assigning credences to satisfy two plausible criteria. The first is 'precision': the method can potentially return any realnumbered credence value in the interval (0,1). After all, for any rational number, we can easily imagine a lottery situation where that rational number represents the obviously correct credence. The second is 'stable utility maximization': if the method yields some credence value, maximization of epistemic utilities based on that returned credence will not require one to assign some other credence. 6 Cf. the die example in Joyce, "Accuracy and Coherence," 283. 7 An anonymous reader suggested that one might want convergence rather than stability. But then the rational method for assigning credences will be to choose the value that is being converged to, rather than the method a single iterative step. And once we choose the value that is being converged to, we will still want stability to apply. This embodies a substantive assumption that the value of credential equipoise does not depend on whether p is true or false (the zero-value is a mere convenience for our later discussion -what matters here is that U T
(1/2)=U F (1/2)).
One might perhaps question this in the case of some propositions p. Perhaps assigning credence 1/2 to a sceptical proposition, such as that I am a brain in a vat, is epistemically worse if the proposition is false than if it is true. This worry may involve a confusion between epistemic and non-epistemic utilities. Moreover, the badness of assigning credence 1/2 to a false sceptical proposition may be accounted for by the fact that this forces one to assign non-high credence to many other propositions, and we should not double count when aggregating the utilities over all the propositions one believes. In any case, assigning supposing U T
(1/2)=U F (1/2) would have to be the way to go if we wanted our utilities not to depend on the particular proposition. Given (a) and (e), U T (r)>0 and U F (r)<0 for r>1/2.
We can now give the Theorem from which the results mentioned in the introduction follow. Suppose r>1/2. U T (r) measures how much, epistemically speaking, one loves having credence r when p is true, and −U F The proof of this theorem is given in the Appendix. In particular, we get that HL(1)≥1/(log4−1) and that HL(0.95)>2.345.
One might be interested to know whether there is any particular pair U T and U F that yields precisely the hate-love ratio on the right-hand-side of the inequality. The answer turns out to be affirmative. First, let U F (r)=1/2−r for r in It is easy to check that the right-hand side of the inequality in Theorem 2 then gives the exact hate-love ratio for this pair of functions. It is easy to see that U F ' is defined everywhere on [0,1] (the point 1/2 is the only place where there could be a problem) and that it is decreasing. Hence U F is concave on all of [0,1].
In the same way, we can check that U T is concave.
The remaining thing to do is to check for propriety. Let ) for x<1/2. It is easy to check, considering the cases r<1/2 and r≥1/2 separately, that this derivative is positive for x<r and negative for x>r, thereby showing that U(x;r) has a strict maximum at x=r. Thus, this piecewisedefined proper pair of utilities achieves the smallest hate-love ratio possible. It might, thus, yield a scoring rule that will be of interest for further investigation.
Conclusions
The constraint that one's epistemic utility functions be proper, i.e., that it never make it irrational to stick to one's credences by the lights of these credences, together with a concavity constraint on the r≥1/2 part of the epistemic utility of believing in a falsehood, is sufficient to determine that these functions need to lopsidedly disfavor believing falsehoods over believing truth.
Plato famously argued in the Republic (587b-e) that the true king is 729 times happier than the tyrant. It may seem ridiculous that an exact number of such sort should appear in ethics. Yet, surprisingly, very natural assumptions do occasionally yield various numbers, as in our result that the epistemic disvalue of being certain and wrong is at least 1/(log4−1) times the epistemic value of being certain and right. 10
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2
First we need the following Lemma. It is basically a version of the FKG inequality, but I will need it under slightly different assumptions than those normally used in the FKG inequality, and hence I give a proof from scratch. 11
Lemma 1: Suppose f and g are non-negative functions on some interval [a,b] , with f monotone non-decreasing and g monotone non-increasing. Then:
This lemma says that if f and g are monotone in opposite directions, we won't increase the integral of their product if we replace f with a constant function that has the same average value (b−a)
Proof of Lemma 1. For simplicity, assume that a=0 and b=1. The general case follows by rescaling. Use 1 A to denote the indicator function of the set A, i.e., a function that is 1 on A and 0 outside (with a contextually indicated domain). Suppose A is either [0,α] or [0,α) for some α in (0,1]. Then:
where the inequality followed from the fact that f is monotone non-decreasing and the subsequent equality followed by the change of variables u=x/α. The overall inequality also trivially holds if α=0. Now, let g  = {x[0,1] : g(x)>} be the level set of g. Then for all x:
Observe also that g λ is always an interval of the form [0,α] 
Since one can reorder integrals of non-negative functions, we can use (2) twice and (3) , which is equivalent to the desired result. 
